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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
not only the right to vote, but also the right to participate in the nomination
of candidates.75 Section 138 subdivision 6 of the New York Election Law is
possibly in conflict with the above Constitutional provision as interpreted, in
that it provides that the signatures of persons signing an independent nominat-
ing petition will not be counted unless those persons were registered as qualified
voters at the last preceding general election. The validity of this statute was
attacked on two grounds in Davis v. Board of Elections of the City of New
York.j' The petitioner contended that the statute was arbitrary and unreason-
able as to voters who had become eligible to vote since the last general election
and also as to the signatories in question who had been eligible to vote at
that time but had failed to register.
The petitioner's contention concerning first voters was not answered by
the Court's per curiarn opinion because there was no showing that any of the
persons who had signed -the petition had become eligible to vote since the
last election.
The contention that the statute was an arbitrary disfranchisement in
regard to the signatories in question was dismissed because the petitioner
failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness attaching to the legislative
enactment' 7 In addition, the Court indicated that certain duties as well as
rights attach to the franchise to vote, and because the signatories had failed to
exercise the franchise in the previous election, the petitioner was estopped from
raising the reasonableness of the statute.
Judge Van Voorhis, in his dissent, would have invalidated the entire
statutory provision because of the "discrimination" against first voters. The
Appellate Division opinion' which was affirmed by the Court, had held the
requirements discriminatory as to first voters, but not so where the signatories,
as here, had been negligible to vote. This question of the effect toward first
voters remains unanswered by the Court of Appeals. It is probable that the
provision will be upheld as to first voters as this case has held concerning those
who failed to exercise their franchise. The requirements of the statute can be
justified as reasonable in light of the administrative problem present. 70
STATE REGULATION OF UNION OFFICIALS
In DeVeau v. Braisted,80 a union official sought a judgment declaring
Section 8 of the Waterfront Commission Act8l unconstitutional, as being in
conflict with Section 7 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 82 and also
contending that he was not convicted of a felony within the meaning of Sec-
75. Hopper v. Britt, 204 N.Y. 524, 98 N.E. 86 (1912).
76. 5 N.Y.2d 66, 179 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1958).
77. Lincoln Building Associates v. Barr, 1 N.Y.2d 413, 153 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1956).
78. 6 A.D.2d 390, 178 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1958).
79. See e.g., Ahern v. Elder, 195 N.Y. 493, 88 N.E. 1059 (1909).
80. 5 N.Y.2d 236, 183 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1959).
81. N.Y. Sass. LAws 1953 c. 887.
82. (TAFT-HARmEY Acr), 61 Stat. 163 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952); giving em-
ployees the right to bargain through representatives of their own choosing.
86
COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
tion 8. The Waterfront Act deals with various union abuses on the waterfront
and Section 8 specifically prohibits any person from collecting dues for a union
if any officer thereof has been convicted of a felony. DeVeau was convicted
of grand larceny in 1922 and received a suspended sentence. The trial court
rendered a judgment for defendant,8 3 (District Attorney), on the pleadings and
the Appellate Division affirmed.84
The Court of Appeals, in affirming, reasoned that Congress had not
manifested any intention, by Section 7 of the Federal Act, to preclude the
exercise of the state police power.8 5 The Court indicated that the Waterfront
Act had been upheld by the United States Supreme Court against constitu-
tional attacks concerning the reasonableness of the correlation between a
criminal record and waterfront corruption, vagueness of standards the com-
missioner was to apply, and deprivation of the right to pursue a calling without
due process of law.8 6 The question of whether the state may restrict the free
choice of union representatives to persons without felony convictions, is
disposed of by citing other occupations so restricted.8 7 The rationale being,
that this is a normal restriction upon occupational qualifications, not an inter-
ference with the free choice of bargaining representatives under Section 7 of
the Federal Act.
Whether DeVeau's suspended sentence was a conviction within the
provisions of the New York Act, was a matter of legislative intent in using the
word convicted.88 This intent is shown by other provisions of the act itself,
which use "convicted" to include a person receiving a suspended sentence.8 9
There is little doubt that Congress did not intend to exclude the proper
exercise of the state police power by Section 7 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. In Allen Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Board,90 the state was
allowed to enjoin mass picketing involving violence, threats to workers, and
the blocking of public streets. The Supreme Court held this type of labor
activity was subject to state control and not pre-empted by the Federal Act.
One of the main tests the Supreme Court used in allowing state action in labor
areas, was the lack of obvious conflict, actual or potential with the Federal
Act.0'
The crucial question here, is whether this particular provision defeats
the intention of Congress to allow employees to choose their own representatives
83. 11 Misc. 2d 661, 166 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
84. 5 A.D.2d 603, 174 N.Y.S.2d 596 (2d Dep't 1958).
85. Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1948); Hotel Employees Union
v. Sax Enterprises, 358 U.S. 270 (1958).
86. Linehan v. Waterfront Comm., 347 U.S. 439 (1954).
87. Matter of Sharpiro, 6 AD.2d 866, 176 N.Y.S.2d 928 (2d Dep't 1958).
88. Richetti v. N.Y. Board of Parole, 300 N.Y. 357, 90 N.E.2d 893 (1950); Weinrib
v. Beir, 294 N.Y. 628, 64 N.E.2d 175 (1945).
89. N.Y. WATERRONT Acr, supra note 81, art. V, pt. I.
90. 315 U.S. 740 (1941); see also Algoma Plywood v. Wisconsin, 336 U.S. 301 (1948).
91. Weber v. Anheuser Busch Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1954); Bus Employees v. Wisconsin
Bd., 340 U.S. 348 (1951).
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without restriction. Hill v. Florida9 2 involved the licensing of union agents,
giving the state power to forbid the issuance of such. license, for enumerated
reasons.93 This licensing power was held to interfere with the intention of
Congress to grant full freedom to employees in choosing union representatives,
and to substitute Florida's judgment for that of the workers.
The practical effect of Section 8 of the New York Act, is to require the
International Union to dismiss the union representative with a felony record,
or function without dues. It is futile to elect one with such a debility, since a
dismissal is certain. The Court of Appeals cites no cases allowing states to
impose such restrictions on union officials. There is serious doubt that the state.
may impose such restrictions in the light of Hill v. Florida.e 4
The Labor Management Reform Act,95 passed this year, sets up a
tomprehensive scheme to exclude convicted felons from union office. It would
seem that Congress is now occupying this field, if it has not in the past. This
case is presently on the Supreme Court docket, but the significance of any
decision will be affected by the new labor bill.
STATE STATUTE PUNISHING WIRE-TAPPiNG PER SE , NOT PRE-EMPTED
The New York Penal Law, Section 1423(6), provides, that it is a felony
to "unlawfully and willfully cut, break, tap or make any connection with any
telegraph or telephone line, wire, cable or instrument, or read or copy in any
unauthorized manner, any message, communication, or report passing over it
in this state."
The Federal Communications Act, Section 605 provides in part, that
((no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communica-
tion and divulge or publish the existence .. . of such intercepted communication
to any person." A violation of this section is punishable under Section 501
of the same act, by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both.
Whether the latter federal provision had pre-empted the New York
statute, was seriously questioned in the case of People v. Broady," where the
Court of Appeals upheld a conviction under Section 1423(6), holding that the
validity of that section was unaltered by the federal statute.
Initially, the Court was faced with the contention that the word "willfully,"
as used in Section 1423(6), must be construed as meaning maliciously or
spitefully, and as the jury had not been charged on this element, defendant's
conviction was erroneous as a matter of law. If thus construed, reasoned the
defendant, the statute would be saved from pre-emption by Section 605,
since it would be regarded as a malicious mischief provision, preventing local
92. 325 U.S. 538 (1943).
93. Must be a citizen of the United States for ten years, no felony convictions, and
must be a person of good moral character.
94. See also, Hotel Employees Union v. Sax Enterprises, supra note 85.
95. PuB. L. No. 86, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 504(a).
96. 5 N.Y.2d 500, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1959).
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